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1. Introduction
Recent work into the cognitive foundations of conceptual integration and blended mental 
spaces provides a unifying umbrella framework for a range of cognitive 'siblings' that have 
traditionally been studied with relative independence, such as metaphor, analogy, concept 
combination, grammaticalization, counterfactual thought, and abstract problem solving. The 
'many-space' or 'conceptual integration networks' theory of Fauconnier and Turner (1994; 1998) 
is an elaboration of the two-space model of metaphor that has been the corner-stone of the 
metaphor field since Aristotle (see Hutton, 1982), and which has underpinned a string of 
conceptual theories from Nietzsche (see Culler, 1980) through Richards (1936), Black (1962), 
Koestler (1964) to Lakoff and Johnson (1980). These theories posit a metaphor (or by extension, 
its cognitive siblings) to concern the interaction of two conceptual spaces; the space which is 
described by the metaphor has variously been termed the target, the tenor or the topic, while the 
space that provides the description has been called the source, the vehicle or the base.
Somewhat problematically, the knowledge required to construct and interpret a metaphor is 
not always readily shoehorned into one of these two spaces. For instance, one would like the 
expressiveness to state that certain low-level knowledge is common to each space and acts as a 
domain mediator between both. Often one needs to state that other knowledge, or perhaps other 
metaphors, must be recruited from outside both spaces to act as the necessary glue to relate them. 
Likewise, it is frequently the case that the product of a metaphor is a new conceptual space that 
2owes its structural origins to the interactions of the source and target spaces, but which has a 
conceptual existence of its own that allows it to grow and accrete new associations independently 
of those origins. The conceptual integration framework of Fauconnier and Turner provides one 
with the theoretical apparatus to make each of these distinctions, by augmenting the traditional 
input spaces with two additional spaces: a generic space that captures the common background 
knowledge that unites the inputs, and an output blend space that contains the conceptual product 
of the integration.
In this paper we explore the computational requirements of the theory of conceptual 
integration, and propose an algorithmic model that meets these requirements. Broadly speaking, 
we see three reasons for seeking a computational account of a powerful theory like conceptual 
integration. Firstly, consider that theoretical utility is inversely proportional to expressive power, 
and that overly powerful theories have little cognitive status, since scientifically, one should seek 
the least powerful theory that accounts for the most facts. It is important then that conceptual 
integration is shown not to be overly powerful. Similarly, a functional view of mind suggests that 
such a theory should be computationally tractable and not make infeasible processing demands. 
So just as cognitive theories should be falsifiable via empirical testing, such theories should also 
be shown to be tractable via computational modelling. This paper demonstrates the tractability of 
conceptual integration networks by showing how a tractable computational model, called Sapper, 
can accommodate the processes underlying conceptual integration. 
Secondly, as we have noted, conceptual integration expands the descriptive options open to 
the theorist of metaphor. But increased options regarding the contents and inter-play of a greater 
number of mental spaces also make for extra degrees of freedom. While conceptual integration 
theory becomes more compelling by allowing sophisticated analyses of a growing body of cases, 
these analyses should themselves be compelling and unambiguous, and not have the appearance 
of cognitive 'just-so' stories. To this end, Fauconnier and Turner have introduced structural 
constraints that pin-down the optimality conditions under which integration can occur in a 
3network, sufficiently reducing the theory's degrees of freedom and thus, the arbitrariness of its 
analyses. An algorithmic perspective on integration can provide yet another form of constraint, 
explaining why it computationally necessary to organize and populate the spaces of an integration 
network in a given way.
Thirdly and finally, a computational model serves as a useful analytic tool in the repertoire of 
the cognitive linguist, in effect providing a cognitive simulator in which integrations or blends 
can actually be 'run'. Simulation of this kind allows a linguist to generate and test a host of 
different structural hypotheses, such as 'what happens if we add this structure to this space?' and 
'how much structure needs to be added here, or removed there, to force such and such an 
interpretation'. Computational models thus make explicit the knowledge requirements of any 
given integration, and allow various empirical claims to be reproduced by others.
With the goal of placing conceptual integration theory on a computational footing, this paper
observes the following structure. In section 2 we provide a brief recap on the nature of conceptual 
integration, or blending, as advocated by Fauconnier and Turner (1994; 1998). In section 3 we 
introduce the basic computational elements from which our algorithmic account of integration 
will be constructed, and in section 4 we discuss how these elements are present in various 
computational models of metaphor and analogy. Section 5 then illustrates how one of these 
models, called Sapper, can actually be seen as instantiating the many-space perspective on 
conceptual integration advanced by Fauconnier and Turner. We argue that to view Sapper as a 
model of conceptual integration is more than convenient rationalisation on our part, and describe 
how the computational perspective offered by Sapper can actually contribute to our understanding 
and use of conceptual integration theory in general.
2. Conceptual Integration and Blending: An Overview
In the terms of Fauconnier and Turner, the interacting content spaces that go into producing a 
conceptual blend are organized according to Fig. 1. Shown in Fig. 1 are the traditional spaces 
4normally associated with metaphoric mapping  the “Source” and “Target” domains. Within the 
Fauconnier and Turner model, these spaces combine via some structural mapping (often a 
metaphoric one) to produce another, independent blended space that provides the focal point for 
the resultant integration. However, perhaps the most significant contribution of the Fauconnier 
and Turner model, over and above the now standard Lakoff and Johnson (1980) two-space 
perspective on metaphor, is the use of an additional distinct co-ordinating space, known as 
generic space. This space contains the low-level conceptual structures that serve to mediate 
between the contents of the input spaces, thus enabling them to be structurally reconciled. We 
give this notion of structural reconciliation a computational form in a later section, but for now it 
is sufficient to say that it involves mapping the conceptual structure of one input space onto 
another so as to obtain a coherent alignment of elements from each. For instance, we can 
reconcile the domains of Scientist and Priest by seeing laboratories as churches, lab-benches as 
altars and scientific-method as religious dogma.
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Figure 1: A schematic view of the Blended Space Model of Fauconnier and Turner. Under the 
structural constraint of Generic Space, a structure in Space 1 is blended with a structure from 
space 2 to create a more elaborate structure in the Output Space. Solid dots represent entities in 
each domain, solid lines represent relations between those entities, while dashed lines represent 
mappings between entities of different spaces.
In the case of metaphoric blends, generic space specifies the basic conventions underlying a more 
complex metaphor. For instance, in the Fauconnier and Turner (1998) example of Death as the 
Grim Reaper, the generic space provides low-level structures that are relevant to the process of 
6personification, and which serve to mediate between the input spaces of a metaphysical concept, 
Death, and a physical concept, Farmer.
The result of this mediation is the creation of a new blend space into which elements of the 
inputs are coherently projected. Because the notion of a blend-space provides a convenient means 
of seperating the product of conceptual integration from the spaces that are actually integrated, 
integration theory yields a compelling account of why many metaphors/blends often give rise to 
emergent properties that are, in a sense, pathological from the perspective of the contributing 
input spaces. For instance, consider the now conventional blend Black Hole (a term originally 
coined by the physicist John Archibald Wheeler), which fuses the abstract notion of a bizarre 
celestial phenomenon (as predicted by Einstein’s Theory of General Relativity) with the notion of 
a common-place hole or rift. The mediating image-schema in generic space for this blend is most 
plausibly the notion of SPACE-TIME AS A FABRIC, an oft-used metaphor in modern physics. 
Incorporated into the blend is an additional source space—that of Blackness—which contributes 
an aura of mystery, invisibility and the unknown to the finished concept. But from its inception, 
this blend ingredient has idiosyncratically conflicted with the ‘hole’ source space inasmuch as it 
is believed that anything that enters a black hole cannot exit; this conflicts with our folk 
understanding of the common-place variety of hole, such as potholes, manholes, and so on. 
Indeed, advances in modern physics have seen scientists further distance their models of 
‘black holes’ from the idealized cognitive models that underlie both ‘blackness’ and ‘holes’. For 
instance, black holes are no longer considered truly black, inasmuch as they possess an entropy 
that radiates detectable quantities of gamma rays; more counter to standard intuitions is the 
related idea that black-holes are self-filling, since as radiation is emitted, black-holes lose their 
energy and shrink, eventually disappearing into themselves (see Hawking, 1975). However,
because the blended concept exists in a derived yet independent space of its own, accessible via 
the lexical item 'Blackhole', such alterations do not corrupt our understanding of the original 
source spaces labeled ‘Black’ and ‘Hole’. 
7Fauconnier and Turner outline five optimality constraints that delimit what it means for a 
conceptual integration network to be conceptually well-formed. These constraints are not 
orthogonal, so one should not expect any given integration to observe them perfectly. Briefly,
these constraints are (i): the integration constraint, which states that blended elements (such as 
Church and Laboratory) should be readily manipulated as single conceptual units; (ii) the web
constraint, which ensures that the integration constraint does not sever the links between newly 
blended elements and their original inputs; (iii) the unpacking constraint, which states that anyone 
who comprehends the blended result of an integration should be able to reconstruct the network 
of spaces that gave rise to it; (iv) the topology constraint, which safeguards the semantic validity 
of an integration by ensuring that those corresponding elements that are blended together (such as 
Church and Laboratory) relate to the other elements of their spaces in a similar fashion (e.g., 
Church relates to Altar in the same way Laboratory relates to Lab-Bench); and (v) the good 
reason constraint, which ensures any concepts in the blend can be granted significance or 
relevance by virtue of its connection to other elements of the blend.
3. Computational Elements
Though not an explicitly computational framework, Fauconnier and Turner's theory of 
conceptual integration networks resonates with a number of fundamental computational ideas that 
find considerable application in the field of Artificial Intelligence. Foremost amongst these is the 
notion of a semantic network, a graph-theoretic structure in which conceptual knowledge can be 
represented in a structured fashion. A semantic network is a data structure that in turn gives rise 
to the process of spreading activation, an idea that has both computational and psychological 
origins. Taken together, these ideas provide the algorithmic means to place conceptual integration 
on an explicitly computational footing.
83.1 Semantic Networks
A semantic network, as defined in Quillian (1968), is a graph structure in which nodes (or 
vertices) represent concepts, while the arcs between these nodes represent relations among 
concepts. From this perspective, concepts have no meaning in isolation, and only exhibit meaning 
when viewed relative to the other concepts to which they are connected by relational arcs. In 
semantic networks then, structure is everything. Taken alone, the node Scientist is merely a 
syntactic token that happens to possess a convenient English label, yet from a computer's 
perspective, even this label is an arbitrary alphanumeric symbol. But taken collectively, the nodes 
Scientist, Laboratory, Experiment, Method, Research, Funding and so on exhibit a complex inter-
relational structure that can be seen as meaningful, inasmuch as it supports inferences that allow 
us to conclude additional facts about the Scientist domain, as well as supporting semantic 
regularities that allow us to express these facts in a language such as English (see Cunningham 
and Veale, 1991; Veale and Keane, 1992).
Long-term memory can be seen as a complex graph structure then in which ideas, events and 
experiences are all represented in this arcs and nodes fashion (we shall refer to the network 
representation of long-term memory as 'semantic memory'). A defining aspect of semantic 
networks is that the representation of these ideas will interweave by virtue of sharing common 
nodes and arcs. For example, the concept node Oppenheimer will partake in relations that link it 
to the domains of Science, War, Politics and Ethics. A conceptual domain in a semantic network 
is a structured collection of nodes and arcs that can be reached by recursively traversing all arcs 
that originate at a given conceptual node. 
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Figure 2: The Market Dynamics of Microsoft and NetscapeInc. Semantic Relations marked with a 
 indicate pejorative (as opposed to strictly logical) negation; thus, Microsoft-
affectNetscapeInc means that Microsoft negatively affects NetscapeInc.
For instance, Figure 2 illustrates a sub-section or domain of semantic memory reachable from the 
concept node Microsoft, while Figure 3 illustrates the structurally similar domain of CocaCola. 
Note how the connectivity of the concept Microsoft means that concepts relating to NetscapeInc
are also included in this domain, while the connectivity of the CocaCola domain causes the 
concept PepsiCo and its associates to likewise be included there.
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Figure 3: The Mirror Domain to that of Figure 1, Illustrating Similar Market Dynamics at Work 
in the Rivalry between CocaCola and PepsiCo.
The domain of Microsoft thus comprises all those concept nodes and relations that can be reached 
by starting at the node Microsoft and its immediate neighbours, visiting the neighbours of each 
new node in turn until no new nodes can be reached. 
3.2  Spreading Activation
This recursive node-visiting process is traditionally called spreading activation in the 
cognitive/psychological literature (e.g., see Quillian, 1968; Collins and Loftus, 1975), and marker 
passing in the computational literature (see Charniak, 1983; Hendler, 1989). From the former 
perspective, not only are neighbouring nodes visited in a wave-like progression from the starting 
node, but an activation signal is propagated as well, from node to node. This activation signal has 
an initial value (or 'zorch', as it is often called in the computational literature; see Hendler, 1989) 
which diminishes and attenuates the further the wave is propagated from its starting point. This 
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attenuation might be specific to the arc carrying the activation (e.g., some arcs in the network 
might be more or less conductive than others, reflecting their salience) or constant across the 
network (e.g., traversing any arc causes 10% attentuation). The amount of activation a node 
receives is thus an indication of how far it is from a particular starting point. In cognitive terms, 
the more activation a node receives, the more central it is to a given domain. If one views a 
conceptual domain as a radial category (see Lakoff, 1987), highly representative concepts 
(nodes) of that domain will receive significant activation, while less representative members will 
receive less.
Spreading activation can be simultaneously initiated from a number of starting points in a 
semantic network (these points are typically called matriarches; see Quillian, 1968), where the 
activation level of a given node is the sum of the activation it receives from different waves. For 
instance, the concept nodes Soft and MassMarket are each reachable from both the nodes 
Microsoft and CocaCola, as shown in Figures 2 and 3. These nodes can thus be isolated as a 
potential common ground for viewing Microsoft as CocaCola. The process of marker passing is 
similar to that of spreading activation, and is used in contexts where distance between nodes is 
not an issue. Rather than use activation signals, marker passers instead propagate distinct symbols 
from node to node; these symbols, termed markers or colours, effectively mark each node as 
being reachable from a given starting point. For example, Charniak (1983) uses marker passing to 
explore semantic memory for connecting structure that will place certain key concepts of a 
narrative into a coherent event framework. For instance, given the utterance "Bill felt suicidal. He 
reached for his belt.", Charniak's marker-passing model would determine a conceptual path 
between the concepts Suicide and Belt, one that passed through the intermediate nodes Hanging
and Chair. In this way, spreading activation and marker passing can be used to fill in the 
conceptual blanks and facilitate the drawing of high-level inferences. Looking again to Fig. 2, we 
see that Microsoft relates to NetscapeInc not merely by a direct rivalry relation (i.e., both 
negatively affect each other), but by virtue of negatively relating to each other's market share.
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If a network is highly connected, spreading activation may well visit most, if not all, of the 
nodes in semantic memory. As Charniak notes, unchecked marker passing can lead to intractable 
processing problems, by giving rise to a potentially unbounded number of inferential pathways. 
Practical computational limits thus need to be placed on this idea of a conceptual domain. 
Typically, these limits take the form of an activation horizon or threshold beyond which a wave 
(of markers or activation) is not allowed to proceed. For instance, a threshold of 0.01 might be 
placed on the allowable attenuation of each activation wave, effectively causing a wave to 
terminate if its activation strength falls below this limit. Alternately, a fixed horizon of arcs might 
be placed on each wave. For instance, a horizon of 6 would mean that only those nodes reachable 
within 6 arcs or less from the starting point would ever be visited by the traversal process.
3.3  Graph Isomorphism
Given a representation of domain knowledge, we are in a sufficient computational position to 
describe the process whereby two or more domains are structurally reconciled. This reconciliation 
may take the form of a structural comparison, an analogical mapping, or a blend. In each case, 
coherent correspondences must be established between elements of each domain as a guide to the 
reconciliation process. In the computational literature, this correspondence problem is 
traditionally seen as one of sub-graph isomorphism, whereby a connected subset of nodes and 
arcs in one domain structure are placed into a one-to-one alignment with equivalent elements in 
another domain (see Falkenhainer, Forbus and Gentner, 1989; Indurkhya, 1992; Veale and Keane, 
1997). The goal of the graph isomorphism algorithm is to determine the largest subset of nodes 
and arcs in each domain that are alignable in this way. Because the algorithm has to reason about 
potential groupings of nodes and arcs, of which there are a combinatorial amount in each domain 
structure, an optimal solution to this problem whereby the largest isomorphism subsets are 
determined will most likely require an exponential amount of time to attain (in computational 
terms, we say the problem belongs to the class NP-Hard; see Garey and Johnson, 1979).
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At the heart of analogy and metaphor then is posited a structure-mapping process that is 
responsible for creating an isomorphic correspondence between semantic sub-structures of two 
domains (in metaphoric terms, the tenor and vehicle domains). Isomorphism is a mathematical 
notion that guarantees the systematicity and coherence of any resulting interpretation, by ensuring 
that each relation and object of the tenor domain receives at most one correspondence in the 
vehicle domain. One can argue that isomorphism is central to metaphor and analogy because, in 
logical/computational terms, all meaning is expressed via structure; if a cognitive process does 
not respect structure, it cannot respect meaning, and thus, cannot itself be a meaningful process. 
Indeed. though it is a graph-theoretic mathematical notion, isomorphism is implicit in the writings 
of many non-mathematical philosophers of metaphor. Black (1962), for example, describes 
metaphor as a process in which a blackened sheet of glass inscribed with translucent markings 
(the vehicle) is placed over a visual scene like the night sky (the tenor). Since only those stars 
which show through the markings are visible to the observer, a sub-graph isomorphism between 
glass and scene is created (e.g., the stars of the Pegasus constellation might be picked out by a 
glass inscribed with a picture of a winged horse).
3.4 Path structures
The importance of structural isomorphism in counterfactual thought and argument by 
analogy (two phenomena for which conceptual integration theory provides an appealing model), 
is readily illustrated by a topical example illustrated in Figures 2 and 3. Chafing under the U.S. 
government's decision in a recent anti-trust case against Microsoft (on behalf of the competion 
rights of a rival company, Netscape inc.), its CEO and chairman Bill Gates argued that to expect 
Microsoft to distribute Netscape Navigator as part of the Windows'98 operating system was as 
irrational as expecting CocaCola to bundle three cans of Pepsi with every sixpack of Coke. The 
analogy is a good one, for it grounds the corporate rivalry between Microsoft and Netscape in the 
well-appreciated, indeed almost visceral, fear and loathing that has traditionally existed between 
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CocaCola and PepsiCo. Both of the latter sell near-identical products in an intensely competitive 
market, where the most apparent sources of marketability are brand recognition and customer 
loyalty. Like Netscape Navigator and Microsoft's rival browser, Internet Explorer (or IExplorer), 
both products have little to distinguish them at a content-level, so for a company to use its 
distribution mechanisms to deliver a rival's product to the market-place can be seen as financial 
suicide.
Highlighted in Fig. 2 and 3 are the relational chains that might conveniently be termed the 
backbones of each domain structure. In Fig. 2 we see that Microsoft creates (and controls) 
Windows'98, which in turn contains the browser IExplorer, which creates a market for itself 
denoted IExplorerBase, which in turn reinforces Microsoft as a company. Similarly, in Fig. 3 we 
note that CocaCola creates (and controls the makeup of) CokeSixPacks, which contain cans of 
Coke-branded soda, which generate a market for themselves denoted CokeMarket, which in turn 
reinforces CocaCola's corporate status. In representational terms suited to later algorithmic 
exploitation, we denote these relational chains using the notation of a semantic pathway, yielding 
MicrosoftcreateWindowspartIExplorercreateIExplorerUserBaseaffect
Microsoft and CocaColacreateCokeSixPackpartCokeCan#6create
CokeMarketaffectCoca-Cola respectively. Both of these pathways are structurally 
isomorphic, and are ultimately grounded in a sub-metaphor that reconciles MicrosoftSoftware
with ColaSoftDrink (both are, in a sense, "soft" products that are aimed at the mass market). This 
isomorphism should allow an algorithm to generate a partial interpretation of the analogy that 
maps Microsoft to CocaCola, Windows'98 to a CokeSixPack, IExplorer to a CokeCan (labelled 
CokeCan#6 in the semantic memory of the system) and IExplorerUserBase to CokeMarket. 
Microsoft and CocaCola are viewed in network terms as the root concepts of each domain 
(and hence, of the analogy), causing all isomorphic pathways within a certain horizon, or size 
limit, originating at these nodes to be considered as the basis of a new partial interpretation. 
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Typically, an algorithm should only need to consider pathways that comprise six relations or less, 
a modest computational bound that should nonetheless allow it to model analogical reasoning that 
involves six levels of recursion, a significant cognitive feat from a human perspective. So when 
all partial interpretations within this limit have been constructed, the algorithm will have mapped 
PepsiCo to NetscapeInc, NetscapeNavigator to a can of Pepsi (labelled PepsiCan#6 in semantic 
memory), and NetscapeUserBase to PepsiMarket. It simply remains for the algorithm to choose a 
maximal set of partial interpretations that can be merged together to form an overall interpretation 
of the analogy that is rich yet internally consistent. 
When the number of partial mappings is small, all possible combinations can be examined in 
an attempt to find a non-conflicting set that produces the richest overall mapping. When the 
number is too large to permit exhaustive search of this type, a heuristic approach must instead be 
pursued, whereby the richest partial interpretation is chosen as a the backbone of the analogy, and 
other interpretations are aggregated around this backbone if it does not violate structural 
isomorphism to do so (this latter approach is termed a greedy algorithm, since it concentrates the 
bulk of its processing resources into developing a single hypothesis; greedy algorithms are the 
basis for Falkenhainer, Forbus and Gentner's (1989) SME model, and Veale and Keane's (1994; 
1997) Sapper model).
3.5. Tree structures
Our discursion so far has focussed on the algorithmic felicity of the path structure, since 
pathways are a natural outgrowth of semantic network organization. For instance, spreading 
activation is best viewed as a path-finding process, in which an activation wave originating at a 
particular node in memory ekes out all those pathways that can be traversed from that point to a 
given horizon. The activation process thus combines the problems of determining relevance (i.e., 
what other concepts are relevant?) with that of structural analysis (i.e.,how do these concepts 
relate?) and with that of metaphor recruitment (i.e., what other metaphors, or blends, must be 
16
recruited into this analysis to coherently bind a overall interpretation together?). In the Microsoft 
analogy of Figures 2 and 3, we have seen how spreading activation is responsible for highlighting 
relevant domain concepts such as Netscape and its browser, while exploring the different ways 
these concepts can interact, as well as drafting in a suitable sub-metaphor to tie this domain to 
that of CocaCola and Pepsi (i.e., viewing soft-drinks as soft-ware).
But the pathway is not the traditional structure favoured by linguists, and for that matter, 
many computer scientists and logicians. Many models instead rely on the notion of a tree. For 
instance, syntacticians use tree structures to represent both the surface and deep form of a
sentence, while logicians use nested predication structures, effectively trees, to represent the 
higher-order meaning of such sentences. The same preference is reflected in a number of well-
known models of analogical structure-mapping, such as the Structure-Mapping Engine (or SME) 
of Falkenhainer, Forbus and Gentner (1989), and the Analogical Constraint Mapping Engine (or 
ACME) of Holyoak and Thagard (1989). In these models, domain structure is represented as a 
collection of tree-like nested predications, in effect producing a forest of trees graph 
representation. For instance, in either of these models, we might represent one aspect of the 
relationship between Microsoft and Netscape as follows: 
cause(cause(sell(Netscape, NetscapeBrowser), 
increase(NetscapeUserBase)), 
decrease(IexplorerUserbase)).
In other words, Netscape's attempts to increase its user-share will have concomitantly diminishing 
effects on the size of Microsoft's share of the browser market.
Computational models of structural alignment can be classified into those that use tree 
representations and those that use path representations. In either case, the model algorithm begins 
by recognising structures of the appropriate type (trees or paths) in the representation of each 
space or domain, and then attempts to isomorphically align these sub-structures in a pair-wise 
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fashion to create local graph isomorphisms, or partial mappings between the domains. These 
partial mappings (often called pmaps) are then selectively coalesced into larger scale, global 
graph mappings, either through a brute-force search through the space of combinations, or via 
some greedy heuristic that bets on certain partial mappings as being more central to the overall 
alignment than others.
4. Computational Models of Metaphor and Analogy
In this section, we outline the basis of five current models of computational metaphor and 
analogy. These models, while reflecting a general agreement that consistent cross-domain 
mapping is central to cognitive functions such as metaphor and analogy, approach the problems 
inherent to establishing this mapping in very different ways. In the section that follows, we 
demonstrate that the design principles of one of these models, Sapper, resonates more with the 
notion of conceptual integration and blending than the others. In anticipation of section 5 then, we 
take the liberty of describing Sapper in greater algorithmic detail in the current section.
4.1 SME: The Structure-Matching Engine
As described in Falkenhainer, Forbus and Gentner (1989), SMEthe Structure Mapping 
Engineoccupies one extreme of a functional continuum, and may be described as an 
exhaustively optimal and maximal approach to structure mapping. SME tirelessly produces all 
possible interpretations of a given analogical pairing, each alternate interpretation deemed 
maximal in the sense that no additional correspondence can be added to it without destroying its 
internal systematicity and coherence. Additionally, SME is optimal in the sense that it scores each 
alternate interpretation, and indicates the best mapping according to a predefined systematicity 
metric. 
Actually, SME is a configurable analogy toolkit, capable of applying different match rules to 
different mapping tasks. Heuristic modifications to SME are additionally reported in Forbus and 
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Oblinger (1990), which replace the factorial merge stage of the original algorithm with a new 
sub-optimal greedy merge. However, as argued in Veale et al. (1996), even with such 
modifications SME is largely unsuited to the mapping of structures in which richly detailed 
character/object descriptionsas opposed to high level causal actionsplay an important role. 
Such descriptions in turn frequently underlie a pervasive form of conceptual blending in language 
 the XYZ construct (see Fauconnier and Turner, 1998), in which two noun concepts are related 
against the ground provided by a third (e.g., 'Elephants [X] were the tanks [Y] of Hannibal's 
army [Z]'; see Veale and Keane, 1998). In such examples, the semantic representation of each of 
the trio of concepts are interrelated via an integration network that binds together key object 
correspondences in each (e.g., Elephant  Tank, Hannibal  Rommel, Scipio  Montgomery, 
Zama  ElAlamein).
In SME parlance, a systematic collection of inter-structure correspondences is termed a gmap
(global mapping). Initially, a set of kernel or root gmaps is constructed by systematically 
comparing the corresponding arguments of identical predicates in each structure. This set is grist 
for the core of SME, a process which then produces successively larger combinations of these 
partial maps (called pmaps) until maximal global mappings are generated. Clearly, the size of the 
initial root set is a key factor in the tractability of the combination process; SME employs the 
notion of structural support to limit the size of this set, exploiting systematicity across the nested 
organization of predications in each structure as an evidential basis for generating new roots. 
However, we demonstrate in Veale et al. (1996) that this support is not at all visible to SME in 
object/character-based metaphors (such as Elephant as Tank), which tend to involve many 
shallow, tree-structured representations linked via common leaves (e.g., ElephantHide and 
ArmourPlating are both Protective, Strong, External and Grey), rather than a few, deeply nested 
trees linked via a common governing predication.
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4.2  ACME: The Analogical Constraint Matching Engine
ACME, the Analogical Constraint Mapping Engine, also places great emphasis on the 
property of mapping systematicity, or isomorphism, but eschews the exhaustively optimal and 
maximal strategy pursued by SME. Instead, ACME constructs a constraint network for each new 
analogical problem to model the various pressures of similarity, context and isomorphism which 
shape the final interpretation. This network is the subject of a parallelized constraint relaxation 
process, from which a sole interpretation emerges, one that is neither guaranteed to be optimal, or 
maximal, or, for that matter, even wholly systematic. Unlike SME, ACME guarantees nothing, 
embodying a heuristic rather than complete approach to the problem. Indeed, ACME pursues 
what may be called a natural or evolutionary model of computation, in which environmental 
forces pressurize a system into converging toward a good, rather than optimal, solution (much 
like the CopyCat model of Hofstadter and Mitchell 1988; Hofstadter et al. 1995).
Like SME, ACME is a tree-based structure matcher that compares two domain descriptions 
in a predicate-calculus-style representation. Hierarchical structure in such descriptions— which is 
originally expressed via the tree-like nesting of predications—is translated into a series of 
inhibitory and excitatory linkages in the ACME network. Nodes in this network correspond to 
possible object correspondences between the source and target domains (e.g., there would exist a 
single node for Microsoft as CocaCola). Nodes representing consistent mappings reinforce each 
other, while nodes representing competing mappings attempt to diminish each other's activation 
level. Once the network is activated, the activation levels of these nodes gradually converge 
toward asymptotic values as the network proceeds through a succession of epochs before 
eventually settling. An ACME network is deemed to have settled when a certain large proportion 
of its nodes have reached their asymptote. Nodes which are still positively activate after the 
network has settled in this way then indicate the cross-space mappings of an overall 
interpretation. Yet while neither maximal or optimal, ACME is slower than SME, and is certainly 
less systematic; this result is borne out in the empirical analysis of Veale et al. (1996).
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4.3  LISA: A Model of Learning, Induction and Schema Abstraction
The LISA model of Hummel and Holyoak (1996) can be seen as a conceptual descendant of 
Holyoak and Thagard's ACME, inasmuch as it too is a connectionist model of structure-mapping, 
albeit one that casts a thriftier eye on the scale of its network representations. Whereas ACME 
constructs a large, specialized network whose number of neurons/nodes is the square of the 
number of concept symbols in each domain, and whose number of inter-node connections is a 
fourth power of this domain size, LISA employs the notion of synchrony of firing to reduce the 
scale of its network considerably. Rather than dedicate a network node to representing a role 
binding between a specific pairing of a predicate symbol and an argument symbol, LISA instead 
assumes that the nodes representing these symbols are related if they are both firing (emitting an 
output signal) in phase. 
Another feature which characterizes the evolution of LISA from ACME is its postulation of a 
semantic layer of micro-feature units (representing generic concepts such as Male, Action, etc.) in 
which higher-order structural representations are grounded. LISA thus uses feature-based 
semantic criteria to judge if two conceptual structures are similar, in addition to the isomorphism-
based criterion of structural similarity employed in SME and ACME. In effect, this layer of 
semantic features serves as a simple form of generic space against which to perform a metaphoric 
mapping, by providing the common semantic vocabulary with which to synthesise the input 
domains.
4.4 Tabletop: A Micro-domain for the Exploration of Similarity
Mining the same micro-domain vein as Hofstadter and Mitchell's (1988) Copycat 
architecture, the Tabletop model of Hofstadter and French (1995) and French (1995) is a non-
deterministic study of the role of similarity and analogy in high-level perception. Tabletop is an 
environment for studying the pragmatically shifting nature of similarity judgements that one 
experiences during the analysis of 'do as I do analogies', in which a student attempts to replicate 
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the actions of a master given certain, contextually-enforced restrictions. For instance, imagine a 
colleague with a broken left arm immovably encased in plaster of paris, who attempts to point to 
the exact bone in his elbow that is damaged; unable to point directly to his left elbow (covered as 
it is in plaster), he uses his left hand to point to the equivalent spot on his right elbow, exclaiming 
'here's the bone I broke'. People generally have no trouble in comprehending this kind of 
analogical action; in fact, the mapping may be so transparent as to be unremarkable to the hearer.
Figure 4: 'Henry' points to a coffee-cup in the Tabletop micro-domain. 'Eliza' must now choose 
the corresponding piece of tableware to touch in response.
Tabletop employs this kind of 'perceptual analogy under contextual constraints' to the micro-
domain of a coffee-shop table-top, on which various restaurant paraphernalia have been arranged. 
On one side of the table sits the master (denoted 'Henry' by Hofstadter and French), who touches 
a single item on the table; on the opposite side sits the student (denoted 'Eliza', to complete the 
Pygmalion metaphor), who attempts to mimic this action from her own perspective. Such a 
situation is illustrated in Figure 4.
Eliza chooses what she considers the best analog to Henry's choice from a host of perceptual 
gestalts, each informed and shaped by different pragmatic 'grouping pressures'. For instance, if 
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Henry touches his coffee cup, as illustrated in Figure 4, Eliza may respond by touching her own 
coffee-cup. However, this rather literal reaction ignores both the geometric position of Henry's 
choice (her right versus his middle) and the high-level grouping of objects in which Henry's 
coffee cup participates (knife to the right, glass to the far right, coffee-pot to the left). Eliza may 
thus find that her plate of chocolate cake better reflects the geometry and chunking of Henry's 
cup, and touch that accordingly.
Hofstadter and French model these various slippage pressures in a non-deterministic, 
stochastic manner, by embodying each pressure via a computational device termed a 'codelet'. 
Individual codelets represent potential choices and actions, and are given as much attention as 
their numeric ranking of urgency dictates. Tabletop thus moves its attention amongst a variety of 
different codelets, each competing at differing levels of urgency for the system's attention. 
Because Tabletop's attention mechanism is probabilistic over these urgency levels, different runs 
of the system may produce different results, yet on average, the most plausible results are 
produced most often.
Though restricted to a specific micro-domain, Hofstadter and French's system is nonetheless 
a model of considerable clarity that serves to pin-point those forces that shape an 
analogical/metaphoric interpretation. In an important sense, the model we describe in the next
section, Sapper, is very much informed by the Tabletop model.
4.5  Sapper: A Bridge-Building Model of Structure-Mapping
Like SME and ACME, Sapper is a computational model of metaphor and analogy founded 
upon the notion of structure-mapping between domains (see Winston 1980; Gentner, 1983). 
However, unlike SME and ACME, but like Tabletop and LISA, Sapper requires that two cross-
domain concepts have more in common than an isomorphic structural setting if they are to be 
paired in an interpretation of a given metaphor. In addition to structural isomorphism, Sapper 
requires that two analogical concepts either share a common set of features (abstract or concrete) 
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or be structurally related to another pair of analogical concepts that do. Concepts that share a 
number of semantic features or attributes are said to be linked by a ‘bridge relation’, and it is 
upon such ‘bridges’ that Sapper grounds the interpretation of a given metaphor. For instance, the 
concepts Scalpel and Cleaver share the associations Sharp, Blade and Blood, and thus a bridge 
relation is established between both. Higher-level analogical correspondences can be founded 
upon this bridge if the corresponding concepts relate to the bridge in an identical semantic 
fashion; thus, because Surgeons use Scalpels, and Butchers use Cleavers, a mapping between 
Surgeon and Butcher can be grounded in the bridge relation between Scalpels and Cleavers. 
Bridges based upon low-level literal and perceptual similarities, such as Sharpness, correspond to 
basic attributive metaphors, and are considered by Sapper as instantiations of the basic mapping 
schema XmetaphorY. Sapper views metaphor interpretation as a process of bridge-building 
in which new bridges are constructed using existing bridges as foundations; thus Sapper might 
construct the bridge SurgeonmetaphorButcher by building upon the lower-level bridges 
ScalpelmetaphorCleaver or SurgerymetaphorSlaughter.
At the algorithmic core of Sapper lies a graph-matching process (see Veale and Keane, 1997 
for a full complexity analysis), one which exploits the bridge schema XmetaphorY to ensure 
that certain, pivotal elements of a cross-domain mapping are grounded in perceptual similarity. 
Sapper is also then, in an important sense, a partial theory of memory organization, inasmuch as it 
suggests that long-term memory is not simply a passive reservoir of information, but a reactive 
system that assimilates new conceptual structure by extending bridge relations to neighbouring 
structures that are, at a local level, semantically similar. Sapper thus employs a pro-active view of 
long-term memory in which shared associations between concepts are automatically recognised 
and noted, making low-level bridge construction a memory-centred rather than mapping-centred 
task. Built upon this reactive memory is a structure-mapping process that exploits these low-level 
bridges as construction cues for the elaboration of a global mapping between the tenor and 
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vehicle spaces; this mapping, essentially a graph-isomorphism, serves as the semantic 
interpretation of a metaphor or analogy.
4.5.1 Cross-Domain Bridging in Sapper.
In Sapper terminology, bridging schemas lay down bridge relations in memory between two 
concepts that are recognised to share some local regularity of structure. These bridges are initially 
dormant, since each represents a potential, rather than an actual, analogical correspondence 
between concepts; it remains for a structure-mapper to later confirm that a given bridge does 
indeed contribute to a systematic cross-domain interpretation. At this point a bridge becomes 
active. This dormant / active distinction proves very useful in lexical priming and spreading-
activation applications of semantic memory, since an active bridge can spread activation (or pass 
markers) into metaphorically related domains. Analogy and metaphor in Sapper thus have a 
representational effect on memory, actually warping the contours of long-term conceptual 
representation, rather than merely relying on memory as a passive warehouse of static domain 
descriptions.
The Sapper model typically employs two distinct constructors to augment its long-term 
memory representation with new dormant bridge relations—the Triangulation Rule and the 
Squaring Rule. The Triangulation rule is invoked whenever two concepts share a common 
association or superclass; for instance, in a metaphor that relates surgeons to butchers, 
triangulation may occur among HumanFlesh: Meat and Flesh, Scalpel: Cleaver and Sharp, 
WhiteSmock : Apron and Clothing, and OperatingTheatre: Abattoir and Location, laying down 
dormant linkages between the concepts HumanFlesh and Meat, Scalpel and Cleaver, WhiteSmock
and Apron, and OperatingTheatre and Abattoir. In essence the triangulation rule is a 
formalization of a similar principle which underlies the plan recognition model of Hendler 
(1989), in which two high-level concepts can be seen as plan analogues if they share one or more 
task-specific micro-features. For instance, an antique letter-opener can be recognized as a 
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workable substitute for a knife in a killing plan, being an object that is sharp enough to 
accomplish the task at hand (murder), yet one which—unlike a knife—will not arouse suspicions 
at airport customs. The same intuition is used in the LISA model of Hummel and Holyoak (1996), 
whereby two high-level concepts can be viewed as analogous if they relate to the same set of low-
level semantic features.
The Squaring rule is a second-order constructor that acts upon the linkages laid down 
between low-level feature concepts by the triangulation rule to build bridges between higher-level 
concepts associated with those similar but domain-incongruent features. For instance, it may be 
used to build (or reinforce) the bridges Surgery : Slaughter, Scalpel: Cleaver, and Patient : 
Cleaver in the "surgeons are butchers" metaphor. Sapper thus employs the squaring rule to 
ensure that any low-level similarities that are discovered by the triangulation rule are percolated 
up to higher-level concepts in a structurally coherent fashion. The use of these constructors is 
illustrated in Figure 5.
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Scalpel Cleaver
Blood
attr
M
Surgeon Butcher
SlaughterSurgery
Operation
M CleaverScalpel
isa
(i) The Triangulation Rule (ii) The Squaring Rule
Sharp
Blood
attrattr
attr
perform perform
depend depend
isa
attr attr
M
Figure 5: The Triangulation Rule (i) and the Squaring Rule (ii) augment memory with additional 
bridges (depicted as  M , a shorthand for the bridging schema), indicating potential 
future mappings.
We now turn to a consideration of how these local regularities of structure, expressed in memory 
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as dormant conceptual bridges, are exploited by a structure-mapping algorithm.
4.5.2 Structure-Mapping in Sapper.
The Sapper structure-mapping algorithm comprises two consecutive structure-building stages. 
The first of these performs a bi-directional breadth-first search from the root nodes of the source 
space or vehicle (denoted S) and target space or tenor (denoted T) in memory, to seek out all 
relevant bridges that may potentially connect both domains. 
This search is constrained to occur within a maximum search horizon H (typically H = 6), to 
avoid the combinatorial explosion that occurs due to the considerable interconnectivity of nodes 
representing complex concepts. This stage, a pseudo-code description of which is presented in 
Figure 6, produces an initial set of intermediate-level partial mappings (or pmaps) by aligning any 
isomorphic semantic pathways that meet at a cross-domain bridge.
Function Sapper::Stage-I (T:S, H)
Let   
Spread Activation from roots T and S in long-term memory to a horizon H
When a wave of activation from T meets a wave from S at a bridge T’:S’
linking a target domain concept T’ to a source concept S’ then:
Determine a chain of relations R that links T’ to T and S’ to S
If R is found, then the bridge T’:S’ is balanced relative to T:S, so do:
Generate a partial interpretation  of the metaphor T:S as follows:
For every tenor concept t between T’ and T as linked by R do
Align t with the equivalent concept s between S’ and S
Let      {t:s}
Let     {}
Return , a set of intermediate-level pmaps for the metaphor T:S
Figure 6: The construction of intermediate-level pmaps is performed using a bi-directional 
search from the root nodes of both conceptual domains.
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Sapper uses the same criterion of predicational matching as SME, namely: inter-concept relations 
(predicates) must match identically, while their arguments may not. Two semantic pathways are 
thus isomorphic if (i) they are of the same length; (ii) they comprise the same semantic relations, 
in the same order; and (iii) there exists a bijective mapping between the concept arguments of 
both. For instance, the source-domain pathway 
SurgeonperformSurgerydependScalpelattrSharp is isomorphic with the 
target path ButcherperformSlaughterdepend CleaverattrSharp, and both 
combine to produce the pmap {<Surgeon : Butcher>, <Surgery : Slaughter>, <Scalpel, 
Cleaver>}
The second stage proceeds in much the same fashion as the greedy extensions made to SME 
in Forbus and Oblinger (1990): the most elaborate intermediate-level pmap is chosen as a seed 
mapping to anchor the overall interpretation, while other pmaps are folded into this seed, if it is 
consistent to do so, in descending order of the richness of those pmaps. Pseudo-code for this stage 
is presented in Figure 7.
Function Sapper::Stage-II (T:S, )
Once all partial interpretations  = { i} have been gathered, do:
Evaluate the quality (e.g., mapping richness) of each interpretation i
Sort all partial interpretations { i} in descending order of quality.
Choose the first interpretation  as a seed for overall interpretation.
Work through every other pmap  i in descending order of quality:
If it is coherent to merge  i with  (i.e., respecting 1-to-1ness) then:
Let       i
Otherwise discard  i
When {} is exhausted, Return , the Sapper interpretation of T:S
Figure 7: The construction of global-level pmaps is performed using a seeding algorithm.
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4.5.. Modelling Structural Slippage in Sapper.
As is evident even from a micro-domain as simple as Tabletop's, context typically imposes a 
variety of interlocking pressures that necessarily complicate our decision-making processes. For 
instance, should Eliza touch her own coffee-cup in response to Henry touching his, even though 
her cup occupies a distinctly different geometric position and gestalt, or should she loosen her 
conception of coffee-cup to encompass her plate of chocolate cake, which bears some superficial 
similarities to a coffee-cup but which, more importantly, occupies a similar relative position to 
Henry's designated item? Moving outside the closed world of the coffee-shop, and its limited 
conceptual repertoire (which Hofstadter and French term its 'Platobet'), we see that any cognitive 
process that employs structure-mapping is equally likely to demonstrate this form of slippage. 
The ability to fluidly reorganize one's conceptual structures in response to contextual obstacles 
and pressures is thus a necessary element of metaphoric, analogical, and blend-centered mapping.
Interestingly, Sapper's squaring rule does, in an important sense, already serve as a recursive 
mechanism for conceptual slippage, one that allows two apparently dissimilar concepts to be 
reconciled if two other concepts, each related in the same way to the first pair, can themselves be 
reconciled. For example, Surgery can be seen as a form of Slaughter by virtue of being able to see 
a Scalpel as a type of Cleaver. But as defined, Sapper is inflexible in the face of another 
manifestation of conceptual slippage, a form which effects the structural interrelation of these 
concepts. For instance, two conceptual spaces or domains may be organized according to two 
similar, but superficially different, sets of conceptual relations, e.g., one space may make 
extensive use of the substance relation (e.g., TablesubstanceWood) while another uses the 
contain relation (BodypartBlood), yet it might be desirable to treat these relations as having 
the same meaning for analogical purposes. Transitivity across such relations is also an issue of 
conceptual slippage: if we know that in one conceptual domain AcauseBenableC, and 
that in another XcauseZ, it might be pragmatically sensible to map A to X and C to Z. 
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Following the Tabletop model, we outline in this section a simple extension to the Sapper model 
that allows for these forms of slippage.
Underlying this soft extension of Sapper is a Tabletop-like slipnet in which different semantic 
relations (i.e., graph labels) are probabilistically connected (e.g., Pslip(part  contain) = 0.9). 
Operating in conjunction with this slipnet is a semantically motivated structure-warping rule, 
which essentially softens the standard Sapper triangulation and squaring rules to allow non-
isomorphic structures to be mapped. Sapper can thus comprehend analogies between domains 
that have been defined at different levels of detail and redundancy: for instance, in the SportsCar
domain one might state that the Engine contains Pistons which control the Wheels, or alternately, 
that the Pistons control the Crankshaft which in turn controls the Wheels. When mapping this 
source structure then to that of either the Jaguar or Puma panther say (an analogy used by the 
Ford automobile manufacturer for two of its sports cars), it may be necessary to either contract or 
stretch the target structure to accommodate the possible occurrence of the node Crankshaft
(which might or might not map to LegMuscle, say).
Given two pmaps of equal depth (i.e., each composed of paths of a given length), a 
probabilistic rigidity measure of how much slippage each involves can be ascertained, as a 
product of the necessary slippage probabilities entailed by each. Thus, a pmap that maps 
XpartYcontainsZ to  ApartBcontainsC has a rigidity measure of 1.0, 
while one that maps the same path to AcontainsBpartC has a rigidity measure of 
0.90.6 = 0.54. These measures can in turn be incorporated into a quality metric that prefers 
rigid pmaps over their looser variants that have slipped.
30
If S…S1R1S2R2S3 is a path being followed in the source space, 
and Pslip(R1, R2) >  (a minimal rigidity threshold)
Then
S…S1R S3 is also a path that should be pursued in the source
Where
R = R1 if R1 is a causal relation, otherwise R = R2
Figure 8: The Core Slippage Principle employed in Sapper.
Given the existence of a relational slipnet to handle label slippage, the complementary problem of 
structural warping can be handled with the single, compositional rule of Figure 8. The action of 
this rule is simple yet effective: two successive semantic relations R1 and R2, linking two 
concepts S1 and S3 via an intermediary S2, can be snipped to produce a path that links S1 and S3
directly; if R1 is a causal relation (such as cause, enable, support, etc.) then it is favoured as the 
relation that directly connects S1 and S3; otherwise R2 is chosen. If applied at every stage of a 
given pathway's development, this rule is capable of removing a significant number of linkages, 
as many are as needed to make the pathway structurally isomorphic with a mirror pathway in the 
target domain. For instance, partcause reduces to cause, as does causepart, while 
partsubstance and partcontains both reduce to part. As illustrated in Figure 9, the 
concepts Engine and CrankShaft are temporarily removed from the source picture to 
accommodate a mapping between Muscle and Piston.
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Figure 8: Path simplification in the SportsCar domain yields a path isomorphism with the
Panther domain.
Note that this convenient deletion of Engine is indeed both temporary and non-destructive, 
inasmuch as it effects just this single pathway. Other pathways that ultimately find a mirror 
partner in the target domain may instead provide a mapping for Engine (for instance, a pathway 
between FuelCap and ExhaustPipe will necessarily pass through Engine, mapping it to either 
Brain or Heart). Ultimately, Sapper will choose those pathways, simplified or otherwise, that 
collectively contribute to the richest overall mapping. The issue then of whether slippage is 
warranted at any level in a mapping is effectively resolved by Sapper's in-built optimality 
pressure to construct the most coherent and elaborate interpretation possible.
5.  A Computational Perspective on Conceptual Integration
In this section we reconsider the above computational models relative to the conceptual 
demands of Fauconnier and Turner's blending theory. The evidence, as we see it, points most 
clearly to Sapper as the architecture most directly informed by the theory of conceptual blending, 
specifically in respect of such issues as the mediating role of generic space, the interaction of this 
space with the input spaces, the emergent character of blend space, and the conceptual integration 
that occurs between each.
5.1 Generic Space
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Consider first the notion of generic space, and the algorithmic guise this notion might assume 
in a computational model. Recall that the generic space of a blend contains those conceptual 
schemas that underlie, and serve to unite, the individual constructs of the input (e.g., tenor and 
vehicle) spaces, thus providing the common conceptual vocabulary of the blend. A model like 
SME makes little or no appeal to the idea of a generic space, primarily relying as it does on 
structural alignment to reconcile its inputs Though SME's mapping may be influenced by the 
surface properties of the concepts in each domain, it does not depend on these properties to 
generate a mapping, and thus does not seek to recruit intermediate blends that make the mapping 
more compellingly vivid. Likewise, neither does the ACME architecture support an obvious 
counterpart to generic space, as again, this model does not look beyond its input constructs to 
generate a mapping. 
But in contrast, the Tabletop architecture makes recourse to a slipnet, or probabilistic 
network, of platonic concepts (collectively dubbed its 'platobet') to reason about those elements 
of a problem that are contextually similar to one another. Those platobetic concepts that become 
activated in the course of a mapping problem, such as that of Figure 4, can thus be construed as 
forming the generic space of the mapping. In a similar fashion, LISA makes recourse to a 
substrate layer of semantic nodes to ground the mapping of two higher-order structures, such that 
any node that becomes active corresponds to a semantic feature that is generic to both input 
spaces. Likewise, Sapper also grounds the mapping of two conceptual structures in literal 
similarity, via its use of the triangulation and squaring rules, so that those concepts which serve as 
the basis of triangulation (such as Blood and Sharp in Fig. 5(i)) can, like their counterparts in 
LISA, be seen as forming the generic conceptual vocabulary of the mapping.
5.2  Blend Space
Though each of the five models supports an obvious counterpart to the input spaces of a 
blend, few actually give computational support to the idea of an independent blend space. Again, 
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SME and ACME support no direct equivalent of a blend space, for since neither model supports 
an explicit model of semantic memory, both are powerless to describe the effects on semantic 
memory of a mapping, the most notable effect being the creation of a new conceptual space in 
which the blend is to reside. Similarly, the modification of semantic memory and the creation of 
new conceptual spaces (which might correspond to a structured partition of its slipnet) are beyond 
the remit of the Tabletop architecture. In contrast however, the LISA model makes specific, 
theoretical claims about the process of schema induction in metaphor and analogy, demonstrating 
how one can acquire, via abstraction, generic conceptual schemas from specific mapping 
problems. However, as the label 'generic' here implies, these abstractions will most likely 
correspond to the rarified contents of generic space rather than to the elaborate structures of blend 
space, since a primary function of blend space is to facilitate the accretion of emergent features 
around a newly blended structure. 
We instead argue that Sapper best captures the notion of blend space via its use of active 
conceptual bridges. While dormant bridges serve to capture in memory the potential for 
combination between two input spaces, the newly awakened active bridges of a metaphor serve to 
explicitly represent the corresponding elements of these spaces that actually fuse to create the 
blend. For example, given the core bridge of a blend, such as that connecting Composer and 
General, it is a simple matter to employ the squaring rule in reverse to visit all those bridges with 
which that bridge is structurally consonant, such as Army : Orchestra and Artillery : Percussion. 
Collectively then, the bridges constructed by Sapper for a given mapping (both dormant and 
active) correspond to the conceptual integration network that ties each of the contributing spaces 
together in a blend. Dormant bridges serve to relate elements of the input spaces to each other 
while simultaneously highlighting those elements of generic space that make the correspondence 
possible, whereas active bridges relate the input spaces directly to the resulting blend space. Since 
these bridges are represented in long-term memory as explicit traces of a specific blended space, 
access to a given bridge will, in turn, provide access to the concepts that connect to the end-points 
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of this bridge. For instance, given the bridge Cannon : Drum, a cognitive agent can, by a process 
of spreading activation (see Quillian, 1968; Collins and Loftus, 1975; Charniak, 1983), retrace 
the efferent associations of its conceptual end-points Drum and Cannon back into the domains of 
Composer and General. This process, which Fauconnier and Turner dub 'unpacking a blend', is 
of particular cognitive and computational importance, since it underlies an agent's powers of 
blend introspection, decomposition and re-organization.
5.3  The Computational Necessity and Role of a Constructor Space
The conceptual foundations of blend theory are conventionally defined in terms of four 
spaces, namely a generic space, two input spaces and a blend space, though this basic architecture 
is easily extended to accommodate blends that fuse more than two inputs. However, to offer a 
detailed computational picture of the algorithmic processes employed in blending, we argue that 
one must posit a fifth, ontologically different type of space, one which we dub 'constructor 
space'. While the four conventional spaces contain conceptual structures of varying degrees of 
abstraction and experiential grounding, this fifth space contains the computational rules of 
structure composition that allow these conceptual spaces to be structurally aligned and coherently 
fused.
These rules, or constructors, are inherent to all computational models of analogical and 
metaphoric mapping, though some models exploit constructors more transparently than others. In 
SME, for instance, one can employ different sets of explicit alignment rules for solving different 
types of mapping problem, while in contrast, the workings of ACME's constructors are altogether 
more implicit, manifest only in the way different mapping nodes of the constraint network are 
hard-wired to each other. In Sapper, these constructors correspond to the triangulation and 
squaring rules, and as such, they can be seen as responsible for the dynamic construction of the 
generic space of a blend.
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The computational interaction between spaces under this algorithmic view is illustrated in 
Figure 9, where those inter-space dependencies that are computational in nature are depicted as 
grey arrows, while those that are wholly conceptual are depicted in black. Following this 
diagram, one can see how the constructor space uses specific rules of structural organisation to 
determine the conceptual middle-ground of a blend, and thus populate the generic space with the 
concepts necessary to achieve an integrated network. 
T2T1 V1 V2
G
Gt Gv
T1:V1
T2 :V2
Constructor Space
Input 1
(Tenor)
Input 2
(Vehicle)
Blend Space
attrattr
Figure 9: The Conventional 4-Space model of Blending, Augmented with a Fifth 'Constructor' 
Space when Considered from an Algorithmic Perspective.
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In this particular example, the triangulation rule is used to reconcile the concepts T1 and V1 via a 
shared association G, causing G to become newly active in the generic space of the blend. 
Similarly, the squaring rule is used to reconcile the concepts T1 and V2 via an established, 
underlying metaphor Gt : Gv, causing this metaphoric schema to likewise become active in 
generic space. This latter mechanism can be seen at work in blends like "Norman Mailer is 
Hemmingway crossed with Patton", where established metaphors such as Pen as Sword may be 
recruited to reconcile and blend the underlying schemas of Author and General. Likewise in the 
metaphor "Viagra is the new sexual rocket fuel", the hackneyed (but visually grounded) Freudian 
metaphor of Phallus as Rocketship can be recruited to allow a higher-level mapping between 
Viagra and RocketFuel.
The rules of constructor space simultaneously determine the generic content of the blend and 
apply this content to structurally reconcile the input spaces via a coherent isomorphic mapping. 
Therefore, only a selection of the possible mappings between the input spaces is chosen, since 
many of these mappings are unsystematic when considered in combination with others. For 
instance, when mapping Surgeon to General (the basis of the CNN/military metaphor "surgical 
airstrike"), one can map either Enemy-Soldier to Cancer-Cell or Enemy-Army to Bacteria, but not 
do both, since the latter does not cohere with the former. What is projected into the blend space 
then is a maximal collection of mutually systematic bridges, each bridge representing a fusion of 
counterpart elements from the input spaces. In Figure 9, input elements T1 and V1 are fused in the 
blend space as T1:V1, while T2 and V2 become fused as T2:V2. These bridges, newly activated 
and established in long-term memory, may later serve as the generic basis for an even more 
complex future blend.
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5.4  Structure-Mapping as a Paramaterized Process
We feel it necessary to posit the existence of an explicit constructor space, at the risk of 
complicating the already elegant four-space model, because of the apparent freedom one has in 
determining which constructors are most suited to a given blend. Indeed, the choice of 
constructors can sometimes be as important as the choice of the input spaces themselves. For 
instance, though the default tenants of Sapper's constructor space are the triangulation and 
squaring rules, an agent may feel it necessary to add an additional slippage rule, such as that of 
Figure 8, when the context demands that the principle of mapping isomorphism be relaxed 
somewhat. Indeed, some contexts actually call for the structure-preserving principle of 
isomorphism to be abandoned altogether, forcing an astute agent to populate its constructor space 
with rules that perversely destroy structure. Consider the mapping problem of Figure 10, in which 
an agent is asked to assign the letters A through J to the nodes of a graph such that no two 
adjacent nodes contain letters that are themselves alphabetically adjacent.
Figure 10: Map the Letters A through Z onto the ten nodes of this graph such that no two nodes 
contain alphabetic neighbours.
Though the problem of Figure 10 is one of reasonable complexity (there are 10! potential 
mappings), it is easily solved if one views it as a structure-destroying blend or formal dis-
analogy. The alphabetic sequence A to J can itself be organised as a graph, albeit a very linear 
one, where A connects to B, B to C, and so on to J. The problem can thus be rephrased as 
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follows: map this alphabetic graph onto the graph of Figure 10, such that the adjacency structure 
of the former is completely destroyed. With this as the goal, a key insight is to map A and J onto 
the grey nodes of Figure 10, since A and J are the least connected nodes of the alphabetic 
sequence, while these grey nodes are the most highly connected nodes of the problem graph. 
With A and J in place, the problem becomes so constrained as to be near trivial. This insight, if 
formalised as a structure-destroying constructor (or more accurately, a destructor) rule, can be 
applied in similar, future problems that demand such a perverse mapping (similarly, the task of 
dividing a four-seasons pizza between two people, so that both get an equal share of all four 
toppings, is a more mundane example of how apparent structure must sometimes be destroyed, 
not preserved).
6.  Applications of a Computational Account of Blending
Given a computational account of conceptual integration and blending, algorithmic models 
can be used to explore the role of blending in both linguistic and non-linguistic domains. A case 
in point in the analysis of cinematic narrative, and the prevalence of borrowing and pastiche in 
modern film, as described in Veale (1997).
Blended spaces, or networks of integrated concepts, serve as a powerful framework in which 
one can describe both the means and the ends of conceptual invention. A blend of two or more 
input spaces can allow a cognitive agent to create novel conceptual structures that increase either 
its understanding of the world, or its ability to describe that world. So from a cinematic 
perspective, blending theory can yield both a constructive theory of how new films are created 
from old, and a descriptive theory of how viewers perceive resonances between different films. 
We currently employ a computational model of blendingin effect Sapperas a critical 
exploratory tool for examining the potential borrowings or pastiches that make up a given 
cinematic narrative. For instance, Sapper can be used to blend the semantic representations of 
KingArthur and FlashGordon to produce a structure that is highly isomorphic with that of the 
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1977 film 'Star Wars'. Likewise, the domain of BaseBall can be blended with the same 
representation of KingArthur to produce a narrative structure that mirrors that of the 1984 film 
'The Natural'. Fig. 11 presents a Sapper analysis of the isomorphism that exists between the 
semantic network representations of StarWars and the KingArthurSaga.
If KingArthurSaga is like Star-Wars 
Then Dark-Ages is like A-Long-Time-Ago 
and Camelot is like A-Galaxy-Far-Far-Away
and Magic is like The-Force 
and King-Arthur is like Luke-Skywalker 
and Guinnevere is like Princess-Leia 
and Lancelot is like Han-Solo 
and Merlin is like Obi-Wan-Kenobi
and Excalibur is like Fathers-Light-Saber      
and Uther-Pendragon is like Lukes-Father  
and Mordred is like Darth-Vader 
and Mordreds-Castle is like Death-Star
and Knights-Of-Round-Table is like Rebel-Alliance
and Knight-Of-Round-Table is like Rebel
and Obtain-Arthur-Grail is like Buy-Luke-C3PO-R2D2 
and Obtain-Arthur-Excalibur is like Obtain-Luke-Fathers-Light-Saber 
and Advise-Merlin-Arthur is like Advise-Obi-Wan-Luke 
and Declare-War-Mordred-Camelot is like Declare-War-Empire-Rebels 
and Battle-Arthur-Mordred is like Attack-Luke-Darth-Vader 
and Kill-Arthur-Mordred is like Defeat-Luke-Darth-Vader 
and Marry-Arthur-Guinnevere is like Love-Luke-Princess-Leia
Figure 11: Structural Basis for the metaphor “Star Wars” is the “Arthur Saga”.
Computational tools such as Sapper allow an investigator to also explore the role of multiple 
borrowings in the same narrative. For instance, as argued in Veale (1997), 'Star Wars' is a 
pastiche that combines many different original sources, from the Arthurian Sagas and 'Flash 
Gordon' to 'The Dambusters' (1954), 'Shane' (1953) and even Akira Kurasawa's 'The Hidden 
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Fortress' (1958). Fig. 12 presents an analysis of an additional isomorphism between the 
narratives of 'Star Wars' and 'The Dambusters'.
If Star-Wars is like The-Dambusters 
Then A-Galaxy-Far-Far-Away is like Europe 
and The-Empire is like The-Third-Reich
and Darth-Vader is like Himmler 
and Rebel-Base is like Blightey 
and A-Long-Time-Ago is like The-Forties
and X-Wing-Fighter is like Lancaster-Bomber 
and Space-Rebel is like Allied-Soldier 
and Rebel-Alliance is like The-Allies 
and Rebel-Command-Centre is like Allied-Command-Centre 
and Death-Star is like Ruhr-Dam 
and Death-Star-Waste-Vent is like Ruhr-Dam-Sweet-Spot 
and Build-Empire-Death-Star is like Build-Germany-Ruhr-Dam
and Declare-War-Empire-Rebels is like Declare-War-Germany-Allies 
and Advise-Command-Centre-Rebels is like Advise-Command-Centre-Allies 
and Destroy-Rebel-Alliance-Death-Star is like Destroy-Allies-Ruhr-Dam 
and Celebrate-Rebel-Alliance is like Celebrate-Allies 
Figure 12: Structural Basis for the Metaphor “Star Wars “is “The Dam Busters”
Interestingly, the notion of a generic space in blending theory resonates well with what is 
commonly called the genre of a film (indeed, it is more than coincidence that both words derive 
from a common root). That is, we see generic space as containing those narrative conventions and 
expectations that frequently guide our appreciation of a film, and which allow us to determine 
conceptual similarities, both superficial and deep, between different narratives. Once a pair of 
narratives have been analysed by Sapper (or more than two, if analysed pair-wise), the generic 
space that has been dynamically constructed is open to analysis, allowing one to explore the 
common foundations on which superficially different narratives have been constructed.
Computational models of conceptual integration not only enable such conceptual analyses, 
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but allow the theorist to hypothesise about perceived shortfallings in the conception of the theory 
itself. For instance, Veale (1997) notes that an adequate study of cinematic pastiche must account 
for blending not only at the level of narrative, but also at the level of character composition. In 
'Star Wars', for example, the character of HanSolo is clearly a pastiche of numerous sources, 
from the knightly Lancelot in the Arthurian blend to the gunfighter in 'Shane', with additional 
elements of 'Buck Rogers' and the pirate smuggler of 'Captain Blood' thrown in for good 
measure. As noted by Eco (1995) in his rather churlish analysis of the film 'Casablanca' (1943), 
this type of intertextual collage is very prevalent in modern film where characters can exhibit 
different personae in different scenes to reflect plot and setting. The exact composition of a 
character blend can thus vary from scene to scene, as dictated by the flow of the narrative. Han 
Solo first appears as a selfish pirate and cowboy, but later sheds some of the negative associations 
of these sources in favour of a more heroic, knightly demeanor. 
In response to these requirements, Veale (1997) proposes a dynamic extension to the theory 
of conceptual integration. The general structure of the proposed extension is illustrated in Fig. 13.
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Input 1
"Theme"
Input 2
"Genre"
Work Space
"Possibilities"
Generic Space
"Conventions"
Dynamic Blended Spaces
Figure 13: A revised blended space model which accounts for the dynamic nature of complex 
narrative blends.
In the extended scheme of Fig. 13, an additional conceptual space, dubbed the workspace, is 
inserted into the standard model to mediate between the input spaces and the blend space (much 
like the constructor space was inserted to mediate between the inputs and generic space). This 
workspace provides a synchronic picture of the possibilities inherent in the blend space, bringing 
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together all aspects that contribute to the blend at each level of the narrative (from overall plot 
structure to individual character traits). For instance, in the workspace HanSolo is represented as 
an equal measure of Pirate, Cowboy, Smuggler and Knight. From this workspace a diachronic 
succession of individual blend spaces can be created, to reflect different levels of blend 
composition at different points in the narrative (e.g., HanSolo as Pirate precedes HanSolo as 
Knight).
We have yet to model this aspect of blend theory computationally, since Sapper currently 
lacks a model of temporal progression. Interestingly, however, it is this very lack that brought to 
our attention the role of dynamic blend composition in the first place. Even in the absence of 
concrete implementations, a computational perspective on cognitive processes can prove to be a 
useful aid to theory development.
7.  Summary and Conclusions
This paper has argued that a computational perspective on cognitive theories such as 
conceptual integration provide not only a proof of concept for these theories, but also serve to 
elucidate important aspects of the theory that might otherwise go unspoken. Supplementary to the 
primary spaces of the basic theory, two new spaces have been proposed: the constructor space, 
which we posit to contain those parametric structural schemas necessary for building the generic 
space from the given inputs, and the workspace, which we claim is a necessary intermediary 
between the inputs and blend space when integrating situations in which temporal progression 
plays a key role.
In addition, we have argued that a particular computational model of structural integration, 
called Sapper, resonates more deeply with the principles of blending theory than any other model 
in the computational literature. As well as exhibiting computational tractability in the form of 
polynomial run-time requirements, Sapper also provides explicit algorithmic support to the 
optimality constraints proposed by Fauconnier and Turner (1998) that serve to curb the 
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expressive power of an integration network. 
Sapper's construction of bridges in long-term memory means that blended concepts have a 
first-class representation that can be manipulated as a single entity. For instance, a bridge between 
Lancelot and FlashGordon can be labelled with the symbol HanSolo, to reflect their contribution 
to this blended concept, and manipulated either as a whole, or compositionally as a pairing of two 
concepts (the integration constraint). Since bridges monotonically add to the structure of 
semantic memory, rather than taking from it, the concepts linked by a bridge still maintain their 
connectivity to the rest of semantic memory (the web constraint). Given a particular bridge, the 
squaring rule can be used to find neighbouring bridges in the same conceptual space with which it 
is structurally coherent. This allows a blended concept to be deconstructed to reveal the additional 
conceptual structures that contribute to its organization (the unpacking constraint). Sapper's focus 
on graph isomorphism as the basis of establishing cross-space correspondences also trivially 
satisfies the topology constraint. But since isomorphism is but one of several constraints acting on 
the formation of a blend, it must sometimes be relaxed in favour of other considerations (e.g., that 
the blend be transparent, or appear to be pragmatically relevant). For this reason, Sapper provides 
for a principled means of structure slippage, making isomorphism a strong preference rather than 
an inviolable demand. Finally, Sapper's use of spreading activation across a semantic network 
representation of memory means that once certain elements of a space are placed into 
correspondence by a blend, the squaring rule will recursively attempt to find correspondences for 
concepts directly related to these elements. Every concept pairing that becomes incorporated into 
a Sapper analysis is thus explainable either as an obvious mapping of counterparts (e.g., HanSolo
as Shane), or as a structural consequence of this mapping (e.g., DarthVader as Jack Palance's 
villain in Shane), thereby respecting the good reason constraint.
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We conclude by noting that the implementation of Sapper described in this paper, in addition 
to the semantic network representations of the spaces used (such as StarWars and 
KingArthurSaga), are available on-line from the author's web-site:
http://www.compapp.dcu.ie/~tonyv/metaphor.html
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